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Patrolling the ‘thin blue line’ in a world in motion:  
An exploration of the crime migration nexus in UK policing     
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Abstract 
 
This paper examines the contemporary role of the police in patrolling the nation’s territorial 
and social borders. The police play an important role in framing ideas and perceptions of order 
and disorder. By selecting when and against whom to apply coercion, the police not only 
constitute crime and criminals. They shape the boundaries of civility and patrol the margins of 
citizenship. Such role has been revitalized lately as they are tasked with immigration 
enforcement functions. Drawing on an empirical examination of immigration-police 
cooperation in England, I explore how police and immigration officers define the remits of 
their job and work alongside in everyday policing. I argue that the reliance on immigration 
enforcement by the police evinces the limitations of modern policing to decipher the new 
geographies of crime and disorder, and their difficulties in offering a reassuring response to 
public anxieties and ultimately in producing social order.  
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Introduction  
 
Policing scholars and criminologists have long debated the boundaries of policing (Loader and 
Mulcahy 2003, Zedner 2006, Fassin 2013, Garriott 2013). Such debate has further 
problematized the assumption that the business of the police concerns or even focuses on crime 
prevention and control. Historians of the English police have showed how the question of social 
order, rather than crime, was the main driver for the institutionalization of police in the mid-
19th century (Brogden 1987, Anderson and Killingray 1991, Sinclair 2006). Its origins are 
linked to the rise of industrialization and the expansion of Empire, and thus an impetus to 
control vast territorial domains and populations efficiently. As Randall Williams (2003) 
explains, ‘we need to think the question of modern policing as a critical strategic maneuver in 
the transformation of national techniques of governance into an international network of 
centralized state powers’. As a modern technique of governance, policing contributes to frame 
ideas and perceptions of order and disorder. By selecting when and against whom to apply 
coercion, the police not only constitute crime and criminals; they shape the boundaries of 
civility and patrol the margins of citizenship (Waddington 1999, 41).    
 
Thinking about the police and policing more generally in relation to social order might offer 
important insights into the contemporary role of the police in patrolling the nation’s social and 
territorial borders. In this article, I explore this novel dimension of the police as arbiters of 
national belonging and producer of social order (Loader and Mulcahy 2003, Loader 2006, 
Bradford 2014) at a time when they are tasked with immigration enforcement functions, in the 
UK as elsewhere (Aas and Gundhus 2016). I focus on the policies and practices under the remit 
of Operation Nexus in the UK. Nexus was originally justified through crime control objectives 
and an indispensable tool for policing in the context of mass migration. Embedding 
immigration enforcement into the criminal justice system to better identify and deal with 
foreign national criminals would bring efficiencies to policing, guarantee equality of treatment 
between citizens and non-citizens, and offer public safety.  
 
Consistent with its crime control remit, one of the main streams of the joint operation was 
identifying and removing ‘high harm’ individuals. Although the definition of ‘high harm’ 
remains vague and varies considerably by regional force, it refers to individuals who are 
prioritized for immigration enforcement action due to the significant adverse impact their 
conduct had on individuals and communities. The vagueness of the policy statement, a lax 
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regulation of criminal deportations and the pressure to increase removal figures in practice led 
to a less than tidy enforcement strategy. While the policy was presented and legitimized on the 
grounds that it will target the ‘worst of the worst’, in practice immigration-police cooperation 
has surpassed the narrow crime reduction agenda to encompass a range of populations caught 
up by immigration enforcement.  
 
This finding goes to the heart of the relationship between policing and social order in an era of 
mass migration. A vestige of vagrancy statutes, immigration laws are a crucial tool of 
contemporary urban policing (Crocitti and Selmini 2017, O’Brassill-Kulfan 2019). They 
bestow the police with wide legal powers to remove sources of nuance –from wife beaters, 
gangsters and petty thieves to rough sleepers, uninsured drivers and junkies- through a one-
fits-all intervention. This amorphous, open-ended, unregulated power aims to restore the social 
boundaries (Dubber 2005) unsettled by globalization. Reminiscent of the quasi-paternal power 
studied by Markus Dubber, the task of policing the border within evidences the role of the 
police in creating a sense of a reliable, orderly, and scrutable social world at a time when ‘the 
line between order and unruliness, civility and chaos, has come to look very thin indeed. And 
it is perpetually rendered more so, by the perception, factually grounded or not, of rising 
lawlessness’ (Comaroff and Comaroff 2017, xi). It pledges to deliver security and certainty to 
a populace who is increasingly spoken about in terms of their vulnerability to abuse and harm 
(Zedner 2003, Ramsay 2012, Zedner 2017), and to closely patrol the conditionality of 
migration status upon sticking to the rules. For some foreigners, lawbreaking, no matter its 
entity, trumps their civic status and confirms their unruliness and otherness (Aliverti 2018).  
 
In the first part, I place migration policing in historical context and detail the rationale behind 
Operation Nexus and its policy remit. The remaining part explores Nexus in action. The data 
on which this article draws was obtained during a study which investigated the nature of 
immigration-police cooperation in one of the major UK police forces where Nexus was first 
implemented. It examined three aspects: 1) institutional and legal implications of interagency 
cooperation; 2) identification processes of individuals under arrest for further checks; and 3) 
the exercise of discretion and decision-making. The project lasted for 12 months, and involved 
observations within two large police custodies where immigration officers (IOs) were 
embedded. Observations were conducted between September and December 2017, four full 
days per week between 9 a.m. and 4 p.m. (approximately 340 hours). The project also involved 
26 formal interviews with police and immigration officers at various ranks (lasting for 45 
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minutes on average), and quantitative analysis of custody data covering individuals arrested by 
the force between January and December 2017.  
 
I shadowed IOs throughout their daily shifts in custody. Embedded IOs had a shift rota to cover 
custody between approximately 8 a.m. and 8 p.m. Monday to Friday. Staffed from the local 
Immigration Compliance and Enforcement (ICE) team, they were permanently deployed to 
police custody. They were allocated office space where they had access to immigration 
databases and police custody system and responsible for monitoring individuals arrested, 
checking individuals who declared or were suspected to be foreigners against immigration 
databases, interviewing them, serving immigration papers, assisting police investigators with 
queries, advising them about the eligibility of suspects to removal or deportation, etc. The 
population under scrutiny was vast: from adults and children who reached to the police to claim 
asylum and, sometimes, crime victims, to crime suspects (including ‘immigration offenders’).  
 
In custody, I observed custody bookings, police and immigration interviews with arrested 
individuals, and informal interactions between police and immigration staff and between them 
and prisoners. I occasionally accompanied staff to immigration court hearings and other venues 
outside custody. Observations were collated through extensive, reflexive fieldnotes after each 
shift. They capture some of these interactions and informal conversations I had with staff as 
faithfully as possible (when it was feasible and appropriate, I took notes of certain phrases and 
expressions), and my reflections on them. Fieldnotes were then transcribed and analyzed along 
with interview transcriptions to identify common themes. Interviews were audio recorded and 
transcribed fragments are quoted verbatim. Unless otherwise stated, transcribed fragments 
relate to interviews. When reproducing interviews and fieldnotes, participants are identified by 
their institutional affiliation, rank and pseudonyms to ensure their anonymity. Likewise, the 
sites where I conducted observations are not identified to protect the anonymity of participants.   
 
This material shows that as an institutional innovation, Nexus is much more than a pragmatic 
solution to deal with crime effectively. By seeking to recreate a semblance of order, it pulls 
together distinct populations under the ‘foreign national offender’ banner, constitutes them 
though the language of law-breaking and harm, diagnoses a unifying response, and reinforces 
racialized fears and anxieties about ‘migration’. I argue that the increase reliance on 
immigration enforcement by the police evinces the limitations of modern policing to decipher 
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the new geographies of crime and disorder, and their difficulties in offering a coherent, 
reassuring response to public anxieties and ultimately in producing social order.  
 
Mapping migration policing in the UK: the genesis of Nexus  
 
In the UK, the police have historically assumed migration control functions through mainly the 
exercise of stops and search powers, and street identity checks (Weber and Bowling 2004). 
Following the introduction of new restrictions on immigration from former British colonies -
particularly non-white majority countries- in the 1960s and early 1970s, the performance of 
inland controls by the police became particularly controversial (Hall et al. 1978, Gordon 1985). 
Policing practices targeting black youth sparked a series of riots throughout the UK (Gilroy 
1982, Paul 1997). While they remained marginal, migration controls were often regarded as 
‘rubbish’ by many officers, who would prefer to concentrate on ‘real’ criminality, and 
undesirable for rebuilding relationships of trust with ethnic minorities (Weber and Bowling 
2008, Bowling and Westenra 2018a). Since the 2000s, as the traditional focus on territorial 
borders in migration policy receded and emphasis was placed on identifying people in the 
country who were liable to removal, inland immigration enforcement grew in its institutional 
presence, resources and powers acquiring independence from the police and becoming a true 
new force inside the border (Düvell and Jordan 2003). The creation of the UK Border Agency 
in 20081 and the myriad of laws and policies that supported its operation displaced the police 
from its migration control responsibilities.  
 
Much cross-over between migration and crime, however, belies that neat institutional 
distinction. This is not only because immigration is increasingly perceived as a security 
problem (a perception that has been forged in part by the criminalization of immigration 
through policies and practices) (Aliverti 2012), and thus firmly within the remit of the police’s 
business. The institutional intertwining between criminal and immigration law enforcement is 
encouraged through a distinctively lax immigration regime which has become an irresistible 
tool for getting rid of ‘problem people’ on the cheap. In a recent decision, the Upper Tribunal 
(Elsakhawy [2018] UKUT 00086 (IAC)) drew a distinction between administrative and 
criminal investigations, and ruled that immigration officers are not required to ‘criminally 
caution’ individuals who they arrest and question when the investigation aims at establishing 
                                                     
1 It was dismantled in 2013 and divided into different departments (Border Force, Immigration Enforcement and 
UK Visas).  
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an administrative breach and a criminal prosecution is not intended. In reaching that 
conclusion, the judges reasoned that an immigration breach is unlikely to lead to a criminal 
investigation (par 141). Notwithstanding the correctness of its empirical justification, the ruling 
makes immigration enforcement an attractive tool in everyday police and may lead to increased 
demand on police resources.    
       
The ‘foreign criminal’ has come to embody the nation’s most derided individual who combines 
racialized fears about the stranger and the criminal, and is the precursor of the recent foreign 
national agenda in criminal justice (Bosworth 2011, Kaufman 2015, Griffiths 2017). Although 
this label is used in policy and discourses without much explanation, it is remarkably difficult 
to define in law, as conflicting case-law shows.2 Not only does the ‘criminality’ requirement 
remains undetermined and flexible, the ‘foreign’ aspect can accommodate some British 
nationals whose citizenship remain suspect and vulnerable to being stripped.3 The blurred 
boundaries of this label and the flexibility and discretion that it bestows on law enforcement 
staff remains one of the most problematic aspects of this agenda. 
 
Amid concerns that ‘foreign national offenders’ were not systematically identified for 
deportation, since 2006 new policy initiatives have been introduced to facilitate immigration-
police cooperation (Home Office 2010).4 The institutionalization of immigration enforcement 
in volume policing is part of the wider en vogue multi-agency approach to policing which aims 
to ‘contribute to efficient and effective crime control by “doing more with less”’ (Skinns 2011, 
165) and fits within the new policing agenda focused on protecting the vulnerable, preventing 
harm, and mitigating and managing risks through early intervention (NPCC 2015). It has also 
been bolstered by the growing focus on organized crime and international criminality in 
everyday policing and on the ‘policing risks’ associated with offending by non-British 
nationals (Blair and Brown 2016, NPCC 2018).  
 
                                                     
2 Recent immigration case law has hinted at its complexities and potential contradictions: what is required in law 
to be categorized as ‘foreign criminal’ and what are the implications of such legal label for different immigration 
decisions? (see eg OLO and Others [2016] UKUT 00056 (IAC); Andell [2018] UKUT 198 (IAC)).    
3 The NPCC define a ‘foreign national offender’ as ‘A person known or suspected to be involved in criminality 
who cannot be confirmed as a British Citizen at birth’ (NPCC 2018, 3). 
4 For example, s. 44 UK Borders Act 2007 (power to search and seizure identity documents), s 144 Coroners and 
Justice Act 2009 (treatment of foreign criminal convictions) and ss 159, 160 and 162 Policing and Crime Act 
2017 (obligation to furnish identity documents and nationality when so requested by law enforcement and court 
staff). 
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In 2010, the Home Office commissioned a pilot study on 14 police custody suites in England 
and Wales to examine the effectiveness of arrangements to determine nationality, identity and 
migration status of arrestees (Hamilton-Smith and Patel 2010). It reported inconsistencies in 
the identification and the exercise of further checks to determine nationality and migration 
status of individual encountered and arrested, and low levels of referrals to immigration 
enforcement. The report also found that the sites where ‘enhanced checks’5 were embedded 
showed a substantive increase in checks undertaken and individuals identified as foreign 
nationals. The findings gave impetus to a Home Office-led operation to identify ‘foreign 
national offenders’ and assess removal opportunities at the early stages of the criminal justice 
process (‘Operation Nexus’).  
 
Operation Nexus was first launched by the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS), the largest 
police force in the country, in November 2012. The then Assistant Commissioner Mark Rowley 
pointed out: ‘Intelligence shows that 27% of all those people arrested for a criminal offence… 
are foreign nationals. Our closer collaboration with UKBA is about focusing on preventing risk 
on our streets for all of us, now and in the future’.6 For the Home Office, one of the main 
drivers for partnering with the police was the ability to build deportation cases based on police 
intelligence and to enable deportation of individuals who although not criminally convicted 
were regarded as ‘criminals’ based on that intelligence.7 In 2013, the House of Commons’ 
Home Affairs Select Committee recommended that Nexus be extended nationwide (Home 
Affairs Select Committee 2013, 19). Nexus was then rolled out to UK’s major regional police 
forces with jurisdiction over metropolitan areas, such as Manchester, Leicester and 
Birmingham. Yet, its implementation has been patchy. It has been claimed that police forces 
around the country have been slow in mainstreaming Nexus into their everyday work 
(Committee of Public Accounts 2015, 6) and that immigration checks were not conducted 
systematically on individuals arrested by the police (National Audit Office 2014, Vine 2014).  
 
Implementation across the country has been complicated by the centralization of operations 
and strategic design in London and poor communication with ICE local teams, despite the fact 
                                                     
5 Such as systematic checks of criminal and immigration databases, and the use of country questions and visual 
aids to interrogate individual arrested on their nationality.   
6 Quoted in the Metropolitan Police website: http://content.met.police.uk/News/Custody-teams-in-place-to-deal-
with-prisoners-from-other-countries/1400012971915/1257246745756?scope_id=1257246763496 (accessed 6 
November 2012).  
7 The Upper Tribunal decision in Farquharson (removal – proof of conduct) [2013] UKUT 00146(IAC) avowed 
intelligence-driven deportations. 
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that these are tasked with delivering it. The fact that the roll-out was negotiated force by force 
by the Home Office, rather than through the National Police Chief’s Council (NPCC), resulted 
in substantial regional variations determined by the priorities and capabilities of each force. 
This has been compounded by the reluctance at chief levels to embrace wholeheartedly the 
‘foreign national’ agenda, given the highly sensitive nature of immigration enforcement. As a 
result, the national implementation of Nexus looks more like an ‘enforcement patchwork’ 
(Provine et al. 2016) instead of a uniform and coherent operational program. Being an 
acephalous initiative, it led to inconsistencies and serious difficulties in establishing guidelines 
and rules governing interagency work. 
 
Despite notable regional variations in its implementation, Nexus consists of two basic strands 
of work: ‘Nexus Custody’ (the embedding of immigration officers in police custody suites) 
and ‘Nexus High Harm’ (a centrally managed team which examines referrals from regional 
police forces to determine whether foreign nationals encountered are a threat to the public and 
to assess immigration enforcement options) (Home Office 2017, 4). ‘High harm’ cases are 
defined as those involving individuals whose conduct results in ‘significant adverse impact, 
whether physical, emotional or financial, upon individuals or the wider community’ (Home 
Office 2017, 5). Each force has some flexibility for defining ‘high harm’ and for referring cases 
to the Nexus team (Vine 2014, 36). As Dan, a Chief Immigration Officer (CIO) working in this 
unit, explained ‘high harm’ cases are those singled out by each force to request support from 
them (fieldnotes, October 2017). Thus, the selection criteria are not purely based on seriousness 
of offending but may relate to the operational priorities of each force.  
 
As such, it provides a legal conduit to criminal deportations when the person’s ‘offending has 
caused serious harm or [is] a persistent offender’8 but does not trigger automatic deportation 
(which requires a sentence of at least 12 months custody), under section 32 of the UK Borders 
Act 2007. Despite its label, high harm cases might not involve convicted serious offenders. In 
fact, they might not involve convicted offenders at all. As the courts ruled, a deportation on 
public good grounds does not require a criminal conviction because it is a crime prevention 
measure, rather than a penal measure.9 The risk assessment involved may rely on various 
                                                     
8 Cfr s.117D (2)(c), the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002, and para. A398, Immigration Rules 
(Deportation).  
9 Bah [2012] UKUT 00196(IAC), par. 45. In Chege, the Upper Tribunal went further by stating that ‘The 
deterrent element may still justify deportation even if there is no longer a risk of future harm’ (Chege [2016] 
UKUT 00187 (IAC), par.39). 
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sources (including hearsay evidence, such as intelligence reports) and may legally suffice as 
long as ‘the cumulative effect of the material […] is such that […] the Tribunal proportionately 
and reasonably concludes, on the whole of the material before it as to the past and the future, 
that the individual's deportation is conducive to the public good’.10 This interpretation of the 
law has shored up operational creativity in the framing of deportation cases by pulling together 
information held by different agencies and bodies, propping up inter-agency cooperation.  
 
The ‘high harm’ strand remains one of the most controversial aspect of Nexus.11 Community 
groups and legal practitioners protested against the use of police intelligence which has not 
been tested in court, claiming it circumvents due process protections by allowing the 
deportation of foreign nationals on suspicion (Webber 2013, Luqmani Thompson & Partners 
2014), while scarce police resources are not being used against serious offenders. Although 
data on the impact of Nexus is not systematically compiled, national statistics on voluntary and 
enforced removals of foreign national offenders by ‘harm type’ show that since 2012 removals 
of individuals categorized as ‘low harm’ have increased while overall return figures remained 
the same (Home Office 2018).12  
 
Far from realizing the managerial logic of selection and prioritization (Feeley 2004, Harcourt 
2007, Brandariz-García and Fernández-Bessa 2017), this data suggests that immigration-police 
might have widened the population under police surveillance. Institutional inertia gravitates 
towards the expansive logic of the ‘hostile environment’ mantra (Aliverti 2015, Bowling and 
Westenra 2018b) which is geared at socializing controls and targeting a broad and diverse range 
of individuals, while reinforcing ideas of disorderly and suspicious populations well engrained 
in the police’s common sense (Harcourt 2001). In the next sections, I explore police and 
immigration staff’s working practices and their perceptions of the remits of their role. Bringing 
immigration on board and casting the net wider in everyday policing, I suggest, may be read 
                                                     
10 Id, par. 64. 
11 Nexus was challenged before the courts on grounds of incompatibility with EU law and discrimination for 
targeting Eastern European nationals for removal: R (Centre for Advice on Individual Rights in Europe) v 
Secretary of State for the Home Department [2017] EWHC 1878 (Admin) and (R (Gureckis) v SSHD [2017] 
EWHC 3298 (Admin). 
12 It coincides with findings from the US equivalent programme ‘Secure Communities’. The Secure Communities 
Task Force, its watchdog, found that the operation of the programme has not been limited to deporting ‘convicted 
criminals, dangerous and violent offenders, or threats to public safety and national security’ and resulted in 
enforcement action pursued against low level offences, such as minor traffic offences (Homeland Security 
Advisory Council 2011, also Cox and Miles 2013).   
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as an attempt to make sense of a world in motion which some officers find profoundly 
unfathomable and hard to peruse.       
 
Bringing immigration on board, redrawing the boundaries of police work  
 
Operation Nexus has embedded immigration enforcement into everyday domestic policing as 
never before. Police officers are encouraged to check the identity and criminal background of 
individuals whom they encounter and suspect are not British nationals, and assess early 
removal opportunities.13 A central immigration point of contact (the Command and Control 
Unit) offers a 24/7 service to regional police forces on information on individuals with 
immigration ‘traces’. Plans are afoot to automate those checks through ‘ID apps’. Immigration 
officers are part of the custody landscape, sharing office space, aiding with the identification 
of individuals brought into custody and routinely partaking in decision making processes.  
 
Bringing immigration enforcement within the remits of ordinary policing has blurred the line 
between immigration and crime enforcement, and had important repercussions on the way the 
police do and perceive their daily work. Often police officers offered help to suspects to return 
to their own country. In some cases, taking advice from the embedded immigration officer was 
listed as a condition for police caution. In an interview involving a couple arrested on suspicion 
of stealing food from a supermarket, Ted, the interviewing officer, warned the man about the 
legal consequences of his admission to the crime and asked him whether he wanted to remain 
in the UK. ‘We can offer support if you want to go back to Romania’, he insisted, and after the 
man courteously declined, Ted told him that he and his partner were required to ‘engage’ with 
Martin, the embedded IO, to get advice on how to keep out of trouble. Speaking through an 
interpreter, Martin warned them of his power to detain and send them back to Romania: ‘If 
they are encountered again, they can’t say that they haven’t been told. If they stay, they work, 
study and are law-abiding they won’t have a problem’ (fieldnotes, November 2017).  
 
This instance illustrates the blurring line between crime prevention and immigration 
enforcement, where the latter is used as a law and order tool (Aas 2014), and the 
interchangeable roles of police and immigration staff. The ‘advisory’ role of immigration 
                                                     
13 A recent judgment by the High Court confirmed that such checks are part of police functions and the police 
have powers to enquire about detainees’ immigration status: R (Centre for Advice on Individual Rights in 
Europe) v Secretary of State for the Home Department & Anor [2018] EWCA Civ 2837, par. 52.  
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appealed to the language of reintegration for avoiding reoffending, whereas the police officers 
mentioned voluntary and enforced return as a possible outcome of the case and injected 
‘immigration related’ questions to their questioning (such as ‘how long have you been here?’ 
‘how do you support yourself?’ and ‘are you working?’) to understand the suspects’ status in 
the UK and their liability for return.  
 
It also suggests a certain agreement within both forces about their overlapping goals. Police 
and immigration officers perceived their roles to prioritize public safety and protection. Yet, it 
was also acknowledged that their remits are different. Police officers were conscious that 
sometimes they were drawn in to deal with what they referred to as ‘pure’ immigration work 
and felt they needed to push back. To deal with people who had breached immigration rules 
like visa overstayers, they suggested, was not part of their job:  
 
I think what we do have to be careful from a policing point of view, is to ensure that much of our 
focus is based around the criminal side of things, and opportunities to deport people who are 
criminally active, and not to get too dragged and involved in the administrative non-compliance with 
visa and things like that… But there is a lot of crossover because we work together and so obviously 
we cc each other in opportunities that arise, so there will be naturally some level of crossover 
(Graham, police sergeant). 
 
Although police officers said that they needed to draw the line, at times they acknowledged 
that the distinction was not clear and constantly overlapped. Sometimes, they arrested 
‘suspected immigration offenders’ out of courtesy for their immigration colleagues. When 
encountering individuals -including crime victims,14 police officers often run checks to 
determine their identities and background. Such instances of information exchange in some 
cases led to further immigration screening and enforcement.  
 
Immigration officers were also conscious of the different remits of their jobs and that their 
work is to enforce immigration laws: ‘ultimately our job as administrative officers is removal 
um, it’s not necessarily seeking out the highest harm all the time’ (Pete, ICE inspector). Pete 
explained that, while ‘high harm’ cases were an enforcement priority and were generally 
                                                     
14 A recent FOI response showed that more than half of the UK police forces admitted to passing over 
information on victims of crime to immigration enforcement (as reported in The Guardian, available at: 
https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2018/may/14/victims-crime-handed-over-police-immigration-
enforcement, 14 May 5 2018, last accessed: 15 August 2018).   
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perceived as the most rewarding cases, the emphasis on removal targets and ‘volume’ 
enforcement shapes the focus of their work. His other colleagues appealed to a more elastic 
idea of ‘harm’ referring to the cumulative financial costs of economies of illegality which 
flourish around undocumented migrants, asserting their harm prevention function.    
 
Both immigration and police officers agreed that illegal immigration breeds and is part of an 
expanding economy of various forms of illegalities: from housing overcrowding and labor 
exploitation to the market in smuggled and counterfeit goods. From this point of view, a 
holistic, flexible, expansive approach to law enforcement is required to tackle the new policing 
challenges posed by globalization. Ben, an experienced intelligence officer, admitted his 
perplexity at encountering four men pushing a hand-made trolley of scrap metals in the middle 
of winter covered in dirt and wearing light clothes. ‘It's like something out of Oliver Twist, 
something Victorian. And, first you don't know who they are, you don't know what they're 
doing, and they look dodgy and they're very suspicious and they're not forthcoming so you 
treat them as a suspect’. Finding out that these were ‘modern slaves’ and part of a chain in a 
wider criminal network took him many free coffees with these strangers and much liaising with 
other agencies, including immigration.  
 
For Layla, a CIO, ‘whether it be the police, HMRC [Her Majesty Revenue and Customs], ah, 
Trading Standards, it's about having a joined-up approach so that nothing is missed’. Although 
she frustratingly acknowledged that all these efforts are never enough because people ‘squeeze 
through the net’, she still considered it the best possible approach:  
 
I could go to a visit on my own, and I could encounter a gentleman and if the police were with me 
they could establish, “oh that person is wanted by the police”, and it's like, that visit then led to an 
arrest, or for instance when the police go out and they are going after one person, they might actually 
walk into a house that is full of immigration offenders and if they had an immigration officer with 
them, then they could be dealt with then and there. 
 
The physical and institutional annexation of immigration enforcement in the police architecture 
brings to the fore the police’s role in preserving social order. While police officers were 
emphatic about their remit as limited to crime prevention and public protection, they often 
accepted that illegal immigration was well within their orbit not only because of the criminal 
ramifications of illegalization. An ever-expansive notion of harm and an ambition to know and 
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control through technological and institutional innovations so ‘nothing is missed’ and the social 
world is made scrutable is deemed necessary to protect a public who is increasingly spoken of 
in terms of its vulnerability. In contemporary Britain, as in other rich countries (Aas 2013, 
Barker 2017), concerns about public safety blends with anxieties about economic sustainability 
and national identity, through the figure of the ‘migrant’. Immigration-police cooperation has 
been propelled to decipher the unknown threat posed by undifferentiated strangers, sometimes 
reinforcing racialized suspicions and fears.  
 
Making people legible: deciphering hidden threats and racializing identities 
 
One of the most challenging aspects of contemporary policing and the main impetus for Nexus 
is the accurate and timely identification of non-British subjects. With nostalgia, some police 
officers remember doing the beat when their patches were readable and they knew who their 
‘criminals’ were. Matt, a long-serving police constable, recounts his experience as a bobby 
when ‘for some families, crime was a profession’ which was passed onto the next generation. 
Echoing Ben’s sense of puzzlement, he painfully admits that the social world he used to patrol 
is no longer scrutable, contained in tight crime typologies, and the police have a hard time in 
pinning down identities and asserting order. PC Lee agrees: ‘the area that we police, extremely 
diverse area, um, lots of activity from all different backgrounds and I think there is generally, 
there is a lack of understanding by lots of police and partners around specific communities and 
backgrounds’. Immigration has been brought into assist with just that task.    
       
The obsession with ‘locking up’ identities is a painful lesson drawn from high profile cases, 
such as that of the prime suspect in the case of Alice Gross, a 14-year old girl murdered and 
sexually assaulted in London in 2011. The man had been previously arrested for sexual assault 
in the UK, when the police failed to request his overseas convictions which would have 
revealed that he had a murder conviction in Latvia. ‘Foreign nationals’, whether victims, 
suspects or witnesses, are always perceived as a ‘hidden threat’. They unsettle police’s 
taxonomies and demand new tools, relations and technologies to pin them down. Due to the 
potential reputational and security risks that undisclosed criminal convictions entail, criminal 
records exchange has become a priority for policing giving rise to technological innovations 
and novel global partnerships (Mason 2011, ch 5, ACRO 2016). Criminal record checks are a 
crucial aspect of the police ‘tool kit’ in dealing with foreigners not just for identification, but 
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to enable expulsion given the bearing of a criminal conviction on migration and citizenship 
status in UK law.15  
 
In the past, the police would take self-declare identification at face value. As Trevor, a custody 
inspector, recounts ‘in the old days if someone said “I’m Mickey Mouse and British” nobody 
would check further his ID. Now, that won’t do’. Even though the police are becoming savvier 
at proving nationality, immigration expertise is regarded as crucial for building the puzzle that 
sometimes are individual identities. Immigration officers can easily access data on individuals 
with ‘immigration traces’. More importantly, they are believed to have a professional ‘fifth 
sense’ for spotting ‘foreigners’. CIO Bruce provided the example of car wash employees to 
illustrate his point: ‘Police encounter a lot of people when they’re out and about and they 
automatically assume they have the right to be in the UK, and of course I know differently, I 
know that, you know, five Greek guys working at a car wash is not normal’. His colleagues 
agreed explaining to me their arithmetic of suspicion: ‘Greek people don’t work on car washes, 
they are legal and they are educated people’, plus Greek ID cards are easily falsifiable 
(fieldnotes, October 2017).  
 
In custody, immigration expertise was often called out to arbitrate upon ‘nationality disputes’. 
Their presence relieved police officers from assuming the distasteful task of spotting ‘non-GB’ 
citizens, as the labeled of institutional racism still loomed large in officers’ consciousness 
(Loftus 2009, 64). Observations of custody practices revealed how racialized markers were 
used as proxies for nationality, percolating police’s crime typologies. Such forms of 
identification were seen as obvious and uncontroversial for identifying ‘foreigners’, rather than 
as potentially racist practices,16 and offer insights on ideas and imageries of who counts as 
British. In one instance a suspect presented himself as Romanian, but a custody officer 
recognized him as Albanian based on his look and accent (fieldnotes, November 2017). 
Similarly, a British accent was an indication of being ‘home grown’ and likely to be British 
when other proxies (name, place of birth or ethnicity) made the person suspect. Evidence of 
the racialization of British citizenship through immigration enforcement (Romero 2008, 
Chacón and Coutin 2018, Parmar 2018), non-white suspects ‘who claim to be British’ were 
                                                     
15 Overseas convictions are equivalent to UK convictions: s144 Coroners and Justice Act 2009. A criminal 
conviction may not only lead to visa denial and curtailment of immigration leave, but also to citizenship 
stripping: s 66, Immigration Act 2014.    
16 This perception is sanctioned by law which exempts immigration enforcement from Race Relations 
legislation: Race Relations (Amendment) Act 2000, s 19D (1). 
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often singled out for further immigration checks. Immigration officers relied on custody 
databases to identify foreigners, where individuals with names that were considered less likely 
to be British were checked against immigration systems. IO Umah preferred to sit close to the 
booking desk so she could see and listen to whom was being brought in custody and could 
identify people of interest more efficiently. Her colleague, Anaya, confessed she is guided by 
her instinct and looks for ‘signs of authenticity’ when someone self-declares British: ‘You 
know in the back of your mind when something is wrong’. 
 
That professional instinct or intuition was often phrased in terms of ‘cultural knowledge’ about 
national groups. Equivalent to the old-fashioned copper’s nose, immigration staff are regarded 
as expert on nationality profiling. Such expertise is often predicated on ‘cultural’ 
embeddedness and shared heritage. In a conversation between IO Anaya and PC Tom, the latter 
noted the difference in working in a majority white British area and in a more diverse area in 
terms of the expertise needed. There is a level of knowledge, he suggested, that came with 
experience. After working in one of Britain’s most diverse metropolitan areas, he was confident 
in spotting certain nationalities. Recalling a recent visit to the local German Christmas market, 
he mentioned that he saw two ‘Romanians’ who he ‘knew they were up to no good’. Anaya 
agreed: ‘you need some multicultural knowledge for doing this work’. She remembered that a 
white British colleague was once asked what religion a man whose name is Muhammed Singh 
was, to which she replied that she had no clue. In her view, this woman was unsuitable for the 
job (fieldnotes, October 2017).  
 
This ‘cultural expertise’ of officers who shared their heritage with suspects was perceived as 
particularly useful for dealing with ‘difficult clients’. It was often sought out to ‘soften them 
up’ and get the information they needed. Vinay put it boldly: ‘only Indians can do this job. 
They can speak the language and they know how their heads work… [You have to know] how 
to treat an Indian, you have to be nice. The English go and ask things. They won’t give this 
information to an English person. They don’t get anything’ (fieldnotes, November 2017). The 
assumption that the ability to decipher national identities is based on common and shared 
heritage has a long history in policing. Imperial policing relied on an army of low ranked 
‘natives’ to aid colonial administrators to ‘see inside’ the otherwise unknown colonized 
societies (Arnold 1976, Sinclair 2006, 27, Owen 2016, 307). Such practices have been 
revitalized in contemporary policing where the task of pinning down people to places is 
complicated by shredded documents and uncertain identities. Fixing identities is paramount for 
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diagnosing risk, but also for assessing criminal justice interventions given the increased 
retooling of deportation and removal for crime prevention.  
    
When police custody becomes the gateway for removal  
 
While the use of deportation as a crime prevention tool is not new (Chacón 2009), Nexus has 
institutionalized intelligence-driven deportations as a ‘quick fix’ to a range of social and public 
order problems that they face. The opportunity to deal with individuals outside of the criminal 
justice system is attractive in an era of austerity. Amid substantial cuts in public spending and 
doubts on the adequacy of criminal justice responses to crime, there is mounting pressure to 
divert people away from the criminal justice system. Foreigners make around 11 per cent of 
the England and Welsh prison population (Allen and Watson 2017, 12), a space which could 
be economized by considering removal opportunities early on in the criminal justice process. 
Out of court disposals, removal and deportation are some of the avenues to reduce the pressure, 
as explained by Paul, a police detective: ‘I think at the minute because resources are so 
stretched we need to be doing absolutely everything possible to reduce the threat from people 
who don't need to be in this country… There are opportunities that exist early on to eliminate 
the threat that that person poses to our communities so we should be taking it up’.  
 
This approach was taken in relation to a man about whom the police had copious intelligence 
regarding his involvement in drugs and weapons dealing, yet no convictions. When his sister 
called the police claiming he was beating her, the immigration machinery was activated to 
detain and deport him back to the Netherlands. Evidencing the intricacies of citizenship, 
criminality and race, his Dutch citizenship was regarded as a formality as he was referred to as 
‘a Somali with a Dutch passport’. His place of birth, that he left when he was a little child, was 
a marker of his identity and fate as gang member. On our way to an immigration hearing in his 
case, Linda, the detective in charge of the case, relayed to me that the evidence the police hold 
on him would not pass the stringent ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ standard of a criminal trial but 
she was hopeful that it will suffice to get him deported in the immigration court. She worked 
in an early intervention team and confessed to me that immigration ‘It’s a tool, a heavy hand 
tool’ (fieldnotes, November 2017). This operation was widely regarded as an example of good 
police-immigration collaboration by removing a threat from the local community, and 
conceived as a more effective way to deal with offending than a criminal justice intervention 
which requires higher standards of proof and might not lead to severe punishment.  
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While the police might regard some aspects of ‘foreign national’ work as unpleasant (Sausdal 
2018), their liability to removal makes this group particularly attractive:  
 
I’d say it’s one of the areas that gets the most reward through its investment. So, if we’re looking at 
stopping people from offending and causing harm to our communities, deporting them completely 
removes them from that element… it’s not just someone in a revolving criminal justice door, it’s 
someone you actually get some results from (Derek, PC).  
 
Martha, a senior inspector, recounts advising her junior colleagues:  
 
[Y]ou put two piles of files on a desk, one is UK home growns and one is foreign national offenders, 
which one would I chose? Chose the foreign national offenders every day, because you’ve got 
potential to disrupt and actually remove… it’s much more likely that you’ll get a better intervention, 
a more long-standing disposal, with your foreign national.  
 
Custody data shows that the police are more likely to discontinue a criminal investigation in 
cases involving foreign suspects compared to their British counterparts. While 37 per cent of 
offences for which foreigners appeared as suspect were marked as ‘no further action’, only 34 
per cent of the offences involving UK nationals were discontinued. Yet, the top 13 reasons for 
arrest of both groups were the same. Based on custody observations and interviews, this 
variation might be linked to the former’s liability to removal or deportation. However, 
removability depends on a variety of legal and logistical considerations beyond the control of 
individual officers (like availability of detention space and flights bound to home countries, 
admissibility in detention, proper documentation, etc.) and hinges on the nationality of the 
individual.  
 
Given this uncertainty, some IOs were reluctant to agree to discontinue a criminal investigation 
in lieu of removal, and complained that the police were dumping cases on them. IO Harry noted 
this as a source of tension, suggesting a deeper institutional unease among cops on the 
contingent and haphazard nature of immigration work:  
 
One thing the police always want to know when you bring someone in is, ‘are you going to get rid 
of him? are you sending him home?’ ‘Well it's not as straightforward as that’, and they are very 
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much, everything seems to be cut and dried with the police, because they are such, such an old 
institution and every part of their job is so regulated and scrutinized, they know what is going to 
happen from A to B, whereas us, every single job is different. You can't say one person is going to 
be removed and another is not, and I think that, to the police is very, quite unfathomable, to them.  
 
The institutionalization of cooperation has turned nationality and removability into an 
important aspect of police’s decision-making, and territorial exclusion a routine device to 
‘manage’ problem populations. The removal of sources of risk quite literally is nowadays part 
of the police toolkit and, despite its logistical vicissitudes, regarded as one of the most effective 
policing instruments. Forced ejection has historically converged tactics of security, social order 
and territorial control (Stoler 2016, O’Brassill-Kulfan 2019). In its contemporary reincarnation, 
its labelling as a crime prevention measure confers the police wide powers to assess risk and 
adjudicate guilt, while promising to restore a sharp line between law and lawlessness, citizens 
and non-citizens, inside and outside. Against the background of waning trust in the ability of 
the criminal justice system to deliver a semblance of security, the border is imagined as a 
protective device to keep the chaos lurking outside -brought vividly closer by growing global 
interconnectness- well away from the British shores.  
 
Conclusion 
 
In his work on the sociology of policing, Ian Loader pointed out that despite copious evidence 
of the police’s limited capacity for preventing and controlling crime, demands by the English 
public for visible police remained astonishingly high. The crux of this paradox, he suggested, 
lies in the place of the police as ‘an omnipotent source of order and authority that is able to 
face up to the criminal Other’ and the symbolic power they command (Loader 1997, 3). 
Although such power is parasitic upon the police’s prerogative to use legally sanctioned force, 
it is not reducible to it (Loader and Mulcahy 2003, 42). Through self-representations and 
mundane interactions with civilians, the police convey imageries of order, stability and 
authority. They wield a distinctive power and an authoritative voice to communicate meaning 
about individuals and the world, to name problems and diagnose its causes and solutions, to 
craft an ‘aesthetic of order’ (cfr Harcourt 2001). Loader argued that such power of legitimate 
naming provides an important guide for individuals to render social reality intelligible, and 
shapes their sense of belonging; or conversely undermines it (Loader 1997, 2006). He also 
observed that, given the orientation of police institutions to support and maintain dominant 
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societal values and their identification with hegemonic understandings of national identity, 
policing practices risk deepening exclusionary ideas and ideals of community which 
marginalize and heighten the vulnerability of groups beyond the secure zone of civility (Loader 
2006, 211). 
 
In an era of porous borders, waning national sovereignties and fading certainties (social, 
political and economic), the police is having a hard time in offering people ‘a cultural template’ 
for rendering the resulting morphing, fluid and messy social reality intelligible and 
apprehensible. As Comaroff and Comaroff (2017) observed, global processes of economic 
deregulation, deterritorialization and liberalization, with the concomitant hollowed out of 
state’s regulatory and policing functions, led to a bourgeoning murkiness between licit and 
illicit, and a pervasive sense of lurking criminality and lawlessness. In this age of ‘fractured 
sovereignty’ (ibid., 68), in countries around the world the language of crime -of law-breaking 
and law-enforcement- has assumed the status of ‘lingua franca’ ‘to debate, dissect, and 
diagnose the condition of “the” social order itself: to reflect on the quality of life and confront 
critical questions of governance and politics, of race and class and gender, of identity and 
civility, and much else besides’ (ibid., 37). At the same time, they suggested that in this edgy 
world of eroded certitudes, crime itself is difficult to dissect and decipher through ordinary 
policing methods, as identities are illegible and the line between law and its transgression 
becomes blurred. In this context, the police have lost their reassuring gaze and protective aura  
(Comaroff and Comaroff 2006, 2017).  
 
We might interpret Operation Nexus and related arrangements to untangle identities and 
extirpate risky strangers as a sign of the difficulties in restoring a semblance of order in an 
increasingly inscrutable world and an attempt to impose ‘law on lawlessness’ (Comaroff and 
Comaroff 2017, 123). The familiar milieu of the ‘bobby on the beat’ where suspects were 
fixated to categories (and lineages) and territorially bounded patches has been substantially 
altered by the increased fluidity and uncertainty of the global city. The ambition to know and 
control through technological and institutional innovations evince precisely the sense of 
‘camera obscura’ in which much contemporary policing takes places and a sense that 
traditional policing and criminal justice tools to decipher crime have been rendered futile. The 
open-endedness, nebulous and fragmented character of Nexus speaks of the policy and legal 
difficulties in defining what and who ought to be policed, in defining the undefinable, and 
offers the police the opportunity to draw the frontiers of order and disorder there where 
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ambivalence prevails (Caimari 2012, 188). Through the familiar language of crime and race 
and the promise to restitute territorial control, the blurring thin blue line might be sharpened 
up.   
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